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ABSTRACT 
In many ways, humans in modern societies seem to 
be occupied to a considerable amount by a longing 
to establish whatever they do as if it were the first 
time any human has ever done it. The arts are full of 
this myth of originality and firstness. However, at 
closer inspection, there often appear events or 
activities by someone else that were at least 
foreshadowing what later appeared as totally new 
and the first time. The article takes up a few cases of 
this kind related to digital art. 
KEYWORDS 
Computer Art; Conceptual Art; Master Piece; Infinite 
Image; Experiment. 
ARTICLE INFO 
Received: 26 November 2018 
Accepted: 30 November 2018 
Published: 18 December 2018 
https://dx.doi.org/10.7559/citarj.v10i3.569 
1 | INTRODUCTION 
The reader of these lines will in many cases agree 
with what the article's heading says when he thinks, 
or she, of a busy street in the city center during an 
ordinary day of the week. She will, however, tend to 
disagree at least a bit if she imagines herself on a 
late Sunday night, at 11 p.m., when this November 
night is cool and rainy and a wind is coming up 
howling along the streets. Everybody has apparently 
already gone home, where they may be sitting in 
convenient chairs, surrounded by cozy lights and 
cracking sounds coming from the fireplace, the taste 
of a good cognac on their lips. But she is walking, 
yes indeed, she's walking down the street with 
nobody in front of her. But she would want someone 
to be precisely there, now in the rainy November 
night, in front of her. 
Now, don't be afraid, dear reader, ramblings of this 
kind will not be our subject matter. We will not be 
concerned here with the spatial more or less linear 




"in front of" will be more of temporal kind, if not 
metaphorical. We will take up a few characteristics 
of digital art and expose them to questions like "How 
new is this really? What exactly of this artistic 
expression is as outstanding as we often hear digital 
art being acclaimed for?" 
In trying to do so, I am not led by a claim that 
maintains assertions like this: "Oh no, nothing in 
computer art is really new, it's just a continuation of 
what we've always done, the only difference is that 
now you do the same as before, only now you do it 
by use of computers." In our selection of a few 
characteristic cases, we see continuation of the old 
in new form. By those examples we want to identify 
the absolutely new in the historic break that 
happened in the mid-1960s when thinking the image 
became more important than making it. The reader  
should not consider any of those cases as final, 
irrevocable, unquestionable, or even only true. You 
will, I'm sure, read them a bit as off the tracks that 
you are so familiar with. You should, I plead, read 
what I write as what I write and nothing more.   
2 | AN ARTIST AND A MATHEMATICIAN 
The story has often been told of the opening of the 
first exhibition of computer art, which was then 
called "generative computer graphics". I want to 
bring it back to your attention anyway. Accidentally, 
the title of the exhibition may have been simply 
"computer graphics" (Computer-Grafik). Nobody 
seems to remember precisely. The artist, who for the 
first time showed his works as a collection of small-
sized programmed drawings, was a mathematician. 
A fact that I would not consider to be of extra 
relevance. But soon, when first reports appeared in 
the press, use was made of the term "only" in 
connection with the fact a mathematician was the 
creator. Like a mantra, this was supposed to tell the 
readers: "Don't take this too seriously, it is only 
mathematicians or engineers who are doing this kind 
of thing. Not artists." 
The artist responsible for the exhibited works was 
Georg Nees (Figure 2). He was working for the 
research section of the Computing Center of the 
Siemens Company in Erlangen, Germany. The 
exhibition was put up on 5 February 1965, in rooms 
of the Studiengalerie of the Technische Hochschule 
in Stuttgart. 
Max Bense, the radically rational philosopher, author 
of books on the new information aesthetics, read his 
text Projekte generativer Ästhetik, that later 
 
Figure 1 | Georg Nees, Gewölle. Experiment in texture. 1965. 
 
Figure 2 | Georg Nees (1926-2016). 
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appeared in an English translation. Up to now, 
aesthetics used to be critical and analytic. Bense 
turned it around by initiating a theoretical back-
ground for synthetic and generative aesthetics, from 
which new artistic practice should emerge. 
After Bense's short presentation, Nees told the 
audience how it is possible to force a computer – 
after all, a machine made to calculate and not to 
draw – into exactly this: into drawing. Not enough, 
those automatic drawings (Figure 1) would also 
possess aesthetic, maybe even artistic, qualities. 
Part of the audience was a group of local artists, 
some of them well-known in a German context. One 
of them, Heinz Trökes (Figures 3 and 4), challenged 
the mathema-tician: "That sounds quite interesting, 
young man. But tell me one thing: Can you make 
your machine paint (or draw) like I do it?" We do not 
know what kind of answer Trökes expected. 
Allowing myself to speculate a bit, he probably 
wanted the technical thinker to surrender and say, 
"of course not, never". 
However, Nees thought for a moment about the 
proper reaction, and then clearly and crisply came 
out with: "Oh yes, of course I can – if you tell me 
how you do it yourself!" Fantastic! Daring! Ingenious! 
Nees may not have realized himself that he had put 
into those few words the greatest answer that all 
speculations about possible and imagined 
achievements of Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) ever 
deserve. Since A.I. is human-made, artificial, it can 
be done only if taken away from its natural origin 
and experience, and that can be done only by 
explicit description. We can always talk about a 
phenomenon. But if we want to rebuild the 
phenomenon, we must first describe it. If it is to be 
simulated by computers, it must even be described 
in terms of computability. 
The anecdote ends with the artists furiously leaving 
the place, shouting aggressive utterings about the 
insulting answer that they cannot, and will never, 
tolerate, which forces them to leave the place. 
Nothing of this kind is known about an opening at 
the Howard Wise Gallery in New Yorktwo months 
later, on 6 April 1965, of the exhibition Computer-
generated Pictures. A. Michael Noll and Béla Julesz 
were showing. The Germans and the Americans did 
not know of each other. There is always already 
someone in front of you… 
 
Figure 3 | Heinz Trökes, Glass mosaic for a school in Hamburg. 
1957. 
 




3 | CONCEPTUAL ART AND MACHINES 
"Vertical lines, not straight, not touching, uniformly 
dispersed with maximum density; covering the entire 
surface of the paper." This is a typical description, 
short, clear, precise. Really? Apparently precise 
enough for its author, conceptual and minimal artist 
Sol LeWitt (Figure 6), to pass his "Instruction" on to 
students to carry it out. LeWitt has written, recorded, 
and published dozens of similarly formulated 
instructions, several of which have been carried out 
at different locations, under differing conditions, and, 
most importantly, by different groups of individuals. 
The artist did not do more than express in his style 
the idea. Other were doing the manual work (Figure 
7), which implied, of course, a lot of interpretation. 
What is "uniformly dispersed", "maximum density"? 
What is a vertical line that is not straight?  
Any such question will find its more or less 
convincing answer by anyone who will, in acting out 
the instruction, nevertheless do almost any detail 
different than her neighbors. 
How complex can such an instruction become, 
before the human interpreter-maker doubts whether 
she is still following LeWitt's instruction, or her own 
ideas? She is supposed to stay with the rules, but 
the degree of openness of the rule's formulation may 
cause her to doubt (cf. Figure 5) 
The instruction is not a program. The interpreter is 
not a machinic evaluator (processor). Unless the 
machine is permitted to inject pseudo-random 
decisions (by random number generation), its 
"interpretation" is the limiting case of interpretation, 
 
Figure 5 | Sol LeWitt, Small etching / black and white no. 7, 1999. 
 
Figure 7 | Students carrying out a concept of Sol LeWitt's. 
 
Figure 6 | Sol LeWitt (1928-2007). 
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and that is determination. Determining the one and 
only possible interpretation, or to give up (because 
there does not seem to be a uniquely defined 
interpretation) – this kind of pseudo-interpretation we 
call "determination". There is no free choice in a 
correct algorithm and program; there is only 
determination of the uniquely determined reading of 
the instruction. 
Where the computer program is carried out by the 
processor, LeWitt had people carry out his 
instruction. Man as a machine (cf. de La Mettrie 
1912), finally realized? 
Sol LeWitt is known for his writings as much as for 
his works. The most famous of his Paragraphs on 
Conceptual Art is "The idea becomes a machine that 
makes the art" (LeWitt, 1967). The machine, in this 
case, was quicker than the thought. I would have felt 
better, had I once written a letter to LeWitt, say in 
1969 or so, whenever it may have been that I 
became aware of his "paragraphs". The letter should 
have contained this: 
Dear Sol LeWitt: 
you do not know me, how and why should 
you? Neither do I know you other than 
through your work and writing, your 
"Paragraphs", in particular. The idea 
becomes a machine that makes the art, you 
say. That's beautiful because it expresses in 
a radical formulation a lot of what is going on 
in current stormy developments that you and 
– forgive me – I also love so much. However, 
I should submit to you the fact that some 
years before you formulated your wonderful 
principle of idea and machine, I had already 
done it. I tend to believe there is always 
already someone in front of us. Please, take 
this as nothing more but a faint voice from 
the other side of the ocean. 
Yours ... 
Sol LeWitt's paragraph lets us think in a different 
way about what we do when we develop algorithms 
and have them actually implemented in form of a 
running program.  
4 | JACKSON POLLOCK AND DISTANCE 
He desperately wanted to become the most famous 
painter of the USA, and he succeeded in the end, 
even though he did not find time enough to really be 
happy about the invention of drip painting, and 
celebrate it from 1947 to 1950, before a few years 
later he crashed his car under the influence of 
alcohol. He had invented mechanisms of painting 
that did not require any carefully designed structure 
and composition. They were rather techniques of 
applying paints from a distance, hardly touching the 
canvas with a brush, but throwing the paint, dripping 
and splashing it in outbursts of his emotion vis-à-vis 
the canvas. A struggle of taking painting as an 
action of the entire body against the empty canvas. 
 
Figure 8 | Jackson Pollock (1912-1956. 
 





Whatever is to be said about Pollock's (Figure 8) 
abstract expressionist style, his success came with 
his retreat from the close sensual touch that painters 
may experience when caressing the canvas in their 
attempts to force it to express what they want the 
canvas to show. 
The distance of the artist from the canvas (Figure 9) 
or other carrier of his work is, of course, a feature of 
any algorithmic art. The artist engaged in thinking 
the image – perhaps as heavily as Pollock did when 
he was in action – is, in a certain sense, continuing 
Pollock's invention and, indeed, taking the thinking 
of the image to mature (Figure 10). 
5 | JOSEF ALBERS AND THE EXPERIMENTAL 
LABORATORY 
When teaching at the Bauhaus, and later at Black 
Mountain College, Josef Albers (Figure 12) drew a 
sharp line between his teaching and art. When you 
go to college, you are a student, not an artist. 
Whether your work will later be recognized as "art" is 
a question whose answer may find some justification 
in your early active years, but it will there certainly 
not find its very reason. Of his own work he thought 
as experiments – experiments mainly in color. He 
wrote of it as "visual research".  
In a late interview for the journal Leonardo, Albers 
shows himself surprised: "I come to a surprising 
conclusion, namely that I did not teach arts as such, 
but philosophy and psychology of art" (Holloway & 
Well, 1970, p. 459). Paraphrasing this: Does an 
artist, when teaching, whose artistic work is largely 
based on programming, not teach arts as such, but 
algorithmics and mathematics? 
From 1950 to 1976, Albers' painting was reduced to 
variations in color only, using one and the same 
formal structure: a nested set of four squares, 
always arranged in the same relative locations and 
proportions (Figure 11). The only tiny variation he 
allowed himself was to drop one of the inner three 
squares so that there occasionally appear three 
more structures of three squares (instead of four) 
each. We may think of those 26 years of Albers' 
creative life (almost one third of it) as turning his 
studio into a laboratory for visual research. That 
became the term he used for his art. 
His research topic was the "Interaction of color". 
 
Figure 10 |  Jackson Pollock, Drip Painting, 1951. 
 
Figure 12 | Josef Albers (1888-1976). 
 
Figure 11 | Josef Albers, Homage to the square: Festive, 1967 
(photo R.H. Hensleigh). 
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This became the title of one of his books. Its first 
edition (of 2,000 copies) was a collection of carefully 
done silkscreen prints whose production Albers 
himself controlled. 
He painted hundreds of homages to the square. 
When, in an exhibition, you see a large number of 
them, you are surprised, if not overwhelmed, by the 
fantastic differences that those simple variations 
create in your mind, in your reactions, and emotion. 
This is so even if you tell yourself that you could 
easily sit down and, within almost no time, write a 
program that will generate all of them. In less than 
one hour you will implement an extremely simple 
algorithm. For the form (those four nested squares in 
their constant proportions) is trivial. All the algorithm 
has to do is: (i) decide whether one of the four 
squares is to be dropped, and if so, which one; (ii)  
randomly choose a set of four out of a discrete set of 
colors. Your "Homage to Albers' Homage to the 
Square" would run this algorithm, and you could be 
pretty sure that it takes years before the results 
would start to repeat. 
An interesting detail of Albers' art-turned-research is 
that, besides giving up all form issues, he very often 
named – on the back of the carrier material of his 
paintings (masonite in the majority of cases) – the 
industrially produced paints he had used. That's 
pure programming. For he had given up mixing 
paints and used them as he bought them in tubes. 
In 1968, when Albers was still alive, the Zagreb 
(Croatia) group of artists and theoreticians who had 
started the "New Tendencies" movement in 1961, 
continued into the fourth version of that event (in 
August 1968) by giving it the title "Tendencies 4. 
Computers and visual research". I do not know 
whether this was in direct reference to Josef Albers. 
If the Zagreb organizers did not decide on this as an 
explicit reference to Albers' experimental art, 
implicitly it was so. Does it come as a surprise to 
anyone that, towards the end of the year 1968, the 
event of "Nine evenings" was staged in New York, 
out of which the movement of "Experiments in Art 
and Technology" (E.A.T.) emerged? In 2018, this 
celebrated its fiftieth anniversary. 
In his reduction to minimal principles (in form), Josef 
Albers opened up for an explosion of varying color. 
He created a situation for precisely controlled 
experiments. He himself conducted those experi-
ments by hand. As he was doing so, others got 
ready to describe algorithmically what he was doing 
manually in an old-fashioned way.  
6 | K.O. GÖTZ AND TWO SOULS IN THE CHEST 
The German abstract expressionist painter, Karl 
Otto Götz (Figure 14), only known as "K.O.", was in 
some way akin to Pollock, but in some other ways 
totally different. The two were akin as they both 
painted out of the movements of their bodies. But 
Götz did this not, or not only, as a spontaneous 
action as Pollock may for some short time have 
done. Götz meditated in preparation of his body-
movements by which he wanted to generate forms 
that he often sketched ahead of time. When he felt 
that his thoughts were exactly the movement he 
needed to do, he jumped up from the chair, literally 
exploding, picking up paint with a large brush from 
the nearby container, rushed through the meditated 
action that his arms and legs were now executing, 
and was more or less finished. "Images of seconds" 
(Sekundenbilder), he called them (Figure 13). For 
seconds, his mind's intention and his body's motion 
were one and the same, and within those seconds, 
the painting was finished. It had to be spread out on 
the floor, as in Pollock's case. But the preparation 
and action were totally different. 
Götz produced a huge work during his long life, a 
work that testifies techniques as far away from the 
cool rational thinking needed for algorithmic art as it 
could ever be. But Götz considered himself as a 
scientist, too. Not as huge in numbers as his 
expressive images of seconds, but also remarkable 
in size and number are his grid images 
(Rasterbilder, Figure 15). The cells of a large regular 
grid of small squares are to be filled by color, or left 
blank. For this, the image format was divided into 
fields, and each field got associated with a relation 
of color to blank as, e.g., 60 to 40. That would mean, 
 





60% of the cells were to be colored, 40% left 
uncolored. 
Students did the actual diligent coloring, usually with 
felt pens. Given the ratio of fill to don't fill, the 
student responsible for one of the fields had to 
decide for each of the cells in his or her field, what to 
do. This decision had to obey the given ratio. 
Students did this by using telephone numbers.  
In his grid images, Götz pursuit certain statements 
and experimental studies inspired by Shannon's 
information theory. An enormous tension is in the 
difference of these two parts of Götz's work, a 
tension between a controlled explosion of the body 
extended by a long large brush, and a cool planning 
of experiments that, as in part of Sol LeWitt's work, 
depends on the availability and readiness of a group 
of other humans to diligently carry out. 
In 1966, shortly after first reports became known 
about computers being essential in the genera¬tion 
of certain simple classes of pictures, K.O. Götz 
became interested in computers. He himself did not 
go as far as engaging in algorithmic pictures. But he 
must have seen a potential for that other part of his 
work. A potential, perhaps, to rationalize part of the 
grid filling technique. 
Exactly this happened in some of the earliest 
algorithmic drawings. Predictably, the grid in various 
forms became a favorite method for some of those 
early experimentalists. Regular and irregular, static 
and dynamic grids can easily be applied by use of 
computers. Each irregular grid is nothing but a 
transformation of the totally homogeneous grid. 
Such an approach demonstrates the power of the 
implemented algorithmic way of thinking. 
7 | KURT KRANZ AND INFINITY 
Die Programmierung des Schönen (Programming 
the Beautiful), was the title of an exhibition in 
memory of Kurt Kranz (Figure 17), an artist who had 
studied at Bauhaus during the last few years of its 
existence (1930-1933, in Berlin), and who later 
became a professor at the Hochschule für Bildende 
Künste in Hamburg (1950-1972).  
Kurt Kranz worked in series and variations. The 
endless game of change, and processes of 
transformation in series of images caught his 
interest more than the individual painting. 
Eventually, series became his exclusive mode of 
expression. An exhibition at Kunsthalle Hamburg in 
1990, celebrating his eightieth birthday, was tellingly 
called The infinite image. In her review of the show, 
Petra Kipphoff wrote in the German weekly 
newspaper, DIE ZEIT: “Never was he aiming for the 
individual image; there never was for him a final 
form, only the experimental series of form, never a 
masterpiece, only variants” (our translation; Figure 
16).  
By that time, algorithmic art was already 25 years 
old and well established. But what Kranz was 
searching for and what he expressed, belonged to 
the starting points and important lessons of 
generative art: The individual work, the static piece 
on the wall was hardly of any interest anymore; it got 
replaced by the class of works the program stands 
for – always already infinities. We may conclude 
that, in consequence, there cannot be masterpieces 
any more. The form of existence of the work is of a 
double appearance – perceivable by humans, and 
computable by machines. 
 
Figure 14 | K.O. Götz (1914-2017). 
 
Figure 15 | K.O. Götz, Statistisch-metrisches Rasterbild, 1960. 
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Hannes Meyer, the last director of Bauhaus during 
its Berlin period, had announced that he would work 
towards connecting three forms of human activity: (i) 
workshop practice with (ii) free art creation and (iii) 
scientific research. He was proposing a fruitful 
cooperation between those three fields of human 
cultural activities that had developed into different 
directions. For the Marxist Meyer, as for many 
innocent practitioners even today, this was a 
fundamentally wrong development. As a member of 
Bauhaus, Meyer formulated his position as a critique 
of the early Weimar phase of Bauhaus (1919-1925). 
Even more than the founder, Walter Gropius, Meyer 
emphasized a strict functionalism serving the 
masses of people instead of serving the needs of 
the few wealthy and rich living their lives of luxury. 
Following Petra Kipphoff's review mentioned above, 
Kurt Kranz learned from Josef Albers who was tea-
ching the introductory course (Vorkurs) at Bauhaus, 
that creative and scientific work did not exclude each 
other, and that art could be carried out as a research 
activity. Many of us would join in and welcome such 
a position. It essentially claims that research, the 
rational and enlightened approach to the world, is 
not as such alien to the creative artist. But this is 
exactly what many are propagating nowadays for 
their actual work. However, we are now more than 
eighty years later. Has much changed? And if we 
rightfully notice and claim to see change, how does 
it actually show up?  
If this is so, we should ask ourselves why there is 
still no unification in sight of art and science happily 
collaborating. We do read a lot about similar goals 
and approaches, and about fruitful cases of coope-
ration. But yet the marvelous journal Leonardo, 
despite its many efforts in bringing together artists 
and scientists in joint adventures, has not really torn 
down walls. Only occasional odd projects may 
correctly be classified as requiring cooperative or 
transdisciplinary efforts. Usually in such cases, a 
small number of dedicated research-scientists 
struggle hard to generate results of creative works 
that are accepted as valid results in both of those 
worlds.  
The question may be, after all: Is truth and the 
search for it – the scientific goal and method – not 
fundamentally different from beauty and 
interpretation of its claims, the artistic goal and 
method? 
We may also ask what is different now with the basic 
infrastructure of, at least, Western-style societies 
that did not exist in the 1930s of Kurt Kranz and 
Bauhaus? To give an answer to this question, and a 
number of related ones, I know of nothing better 
than to point at the one technology that did then not 
exist at all, but that is now ubiquitous both in breadth 
and depth of its distribution. I mean, and everyone 
will share this with me: computing technology in all 
its variants. With only a tiny bit of exaggeration, we 
can say that today nearly everybody is roaming his 
or her city or village, home or workplace, morning or 
 
Figure 16 | Kurt Kranz, bacteriasnomeio, 1930s. 
 




evening, as individual or social activity – always 
already equipped with a computing machine of small 
and handy size, of enormous local and global power, 
and appearing as possessing tool-like and medial 
qualities at the same time. Computing technology, 
the semiotic machine, as Mihai Nadin called it 
(2007), is with us and upon us and underneath 
everything we do. 
What is different, we may say, is that the deepest 
and most widespread cultural revolution of all times 
has taken place and is still conquering the seemingly 
last refuges, and discovering huge new areas of life, 
still to be turned upside-down such that the young 
generations rejoice, and the old ones mourn. This 
permanent revolution must correctly be called "The 
Algorithmic Revolution": The revolution of 
transforming into machinic computable form 
everything that is already computable, and of 
reducing to computable form everything that is not 
yet computable. This enormous epochal task has 
started its path through cultures soon after the 
founding scientists had come up with their ground-
breaking results: Kurt Gödel (1931), Alan M. Turing 
(1937), and John von Neumann (1945). More and 
new works are still under way for the algorithmic 
revolution to creep into all the arteries of human 
individual and social life. In fact, it is on its way at an 
accelerating speed, and with an enormous impact. 
Much of it is devastation.  
8 | THE MASTERPIECE AND DISAPPEARANCE 
History is not a neatly lined up chain of events, one 
after or before the other. History does, in the 
collective memory of a nation or society or human-
kind, happen when it gets written. Therefore, it is 
happening all over again, when a new interpretation 
appears. History is more like a complex graph (if we 
want to take to such formal language). 
In the fine arts, masterpieces appear seldom during 
the lifetime of their creator. It does happen, 
occasionally. But the recognition of a painting as 
being greater in its style or subject than all the 
others, is usually acknowledged only after the world 
has had opportunities to formulate such statement. 
But now, in times of things and processes being in a 
permanent state of change, the masterpiece seems 
to be disappearing. As if it has had its time. "All that 
is solid melts into air", wrote Marx and Engels in 
their analysis of bourgeois society (2004). They 
were pointing at the necessity in capitalism to turn all 
that into commodity and, thus, into objects of the 
marketplace, that people would like to keep and hold 
and be assured of even in the future. 
Computers and computing play an enormously 
important role in this process of melting down 
everything that used to be fixed and stable. In our 
field of concern – fine art – we must observe that all 
things and processes now have a tendency of 
duplicating. The melting is not a disappearance. It is 
rather a change of ontological state. Things 
duplicate into their surface and their subface, when 
they fall under the change that is called digitization. 
Under its regime, the surfaces of things and 
processes, that we are so familiar with, grow a 
second layer of their ontology. That layer is hidden 
in the machines, systems, and media of computing. I 
call it the subface. The subface is real and has great 
impact. But it is hidden, and we are usually not 
aware of it. It is hidden in computing equipment, in 
the cloud. It is computable by the machine, whereas 
the surface is perceivable by us via our senses. The 
computable, however decides whether we get credit 
from the bank. Or whether we are considered to be 
a potential terrorist. In the case of art, it decides 
what a work of art (that is no longer static) is going 
to do and look like in the next moment. 
The disappearance of the masterpiece is thus built 
into the ontology of the works of art. As we become 
aware of something that we had not observed yet, 
but now compare and realize that our own idea has 
already been used elsewhere by someone we have 
never heard of, we realize that mental priority is 
disappearing. Everything gets more and more into 
flux, and the algorithmic revolution is washing away 
all fundamentals of the bourgeois individual. We 
used to be surprised by detecting someone before 
us having done what we have just discovered for 
ourselves. We must now realize that this is 
becoming the permanent fate of our cherished 
capability of creating the new. The new is slowly 
disappearing, and the old may become the new. 
At the crossroads, we see the infinite works that, for 
artists like Kurt Kranz, were essential for their art. 
For the algorists, the infinite work is what they 
always create. Nothing special. 
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